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I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Medicare is about to begin offering prescription drug
2
benefits. Providing drug benefits through the Medicare program
is a noted achievement that may help ease the financial pressures
faced by millions of older Americans. It is noteworthy that
3
Medicare will include coverage for off-label use of some
4
Prescriptions for off-label use of drugs
prescription drugs.
5
continue to climb, while concerns about the safety of off-label use
† Cynthia A. Moyer is a 1990 graduate of Harvard Law School and a
shareholder with the Minneapolis law firm of Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., where she
practices in the business litigation group, focusing on health law and intellectual
property.
1. Medicare is a social health insurance program that provides basic hospital
coverage for Americans sixty-five years of age or older. Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1395(c) (2000). It also provides coverage for some people under age
sixty-five with disabilities and for people with end-stage renal disease. Id.
2. On December 8, 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, which
amended Title XVIII of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101. The
prescription drug benefit program will become available to beneficiaries
beginning in January 2006. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101(a)(2).
3. “Off-label use” refers to a use other than the FDA-approved uses. See
Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and ‘Off-Label’ Uses of Prescription
Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 276–82 (1996).
4. See Medicare Program; Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 69 Fed. Reg.
46,632 (proposed Aug. 3, 2004) (describing the rules proposed by the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to implement the new Medicare
Prescription Drug Benefit).
5. See Paul D. Rheingold & David B. Rheingold, Offense or Defense? Managing

927

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 5
5MOYER.DOC

928

3/13/2005 3:29:11 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

6

are also on the rise. Concerns regarding off-label use include fears
7
about untested prescribing practices and patients agreeing to a
suggested course of treatment, at least in part, because the risks are
8
not known—by the physician or the patient. Concerns also exist
regarding the pharmaceutical companies’ promotion of off-label
use as a means to increase sales while side stepping the onerous
9
FDA approval process.
Such promotion encourages the
prescription of drugs for uses that have not undergone rigorous
study and may increase risk to patients.
Who decides whether a drug can be used off-label and under
what circumstances? If a physician decides to prescribe a drug offlabel, what legal issues, if any, should the physician be aware of?
the Off-Label Use Claim, 37 TRIAL 52, 52 (2001) (observing that there has been an
increase in off-label claims by injured plaintiffs because off-label use of medical
products is a growing practice); see also Veronica Henry, Off-Label Prescribing Legal
Implications, 20 J. LEGAL MED. 365, 365 (1999) (“According to some estimates,
almost half the United States population currently may be taking a medication
prescribed for an unapproved reason.”).
6. See Alison Young & Chris Adams, “Off-label” Drugs Take Their Toll, KNIGHT
RIDDER NEWSPAPERS, Nov. 2, 2003, at http://realcities.com/mld/krwashington/
news/special_packages/riskyrx/7146578.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
7. See James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed
Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 72 (1998).
In discussing the fen/phen controversy of the late 1990s, the authors noted:
[T]he popular media discovered that the commonly prescribed
combination of fenfluramine and phentermine was an off-label use.
Both drugs had been approved separately for labeling and marketing for
short-term use in weight reduction, but they often had been prescribed
together for not only short-term, but long-term weight-loss treatment.
Millions of people used one or more of the drugs.
Id. at 71.
8. Young & Adams, supra note 6. “A six month Knight Ridder investigation
has found that patients nationwide are being injured and killed as doctors
routinely prescribe drugs in ways the FDA never certified as safe and effective.” Id.
9. Stoffelmayr, supra note 3, at 277. Manufacturers have a strong and
obvious incentive to encourage off-label use since such uses increase overall sales.
Id. at 279–80. The author explained:
[D]espite the FDA restrictions, manufacturers have been very successful
at promoting off-label uses. Among the most common methods are
funding research into off-label drug uses, sponsoring continuing
education programs and symposia in which ostensibly independent
researchers discuss off-label uses, distributing reprints of journal articles
on off-label uses, and purchasing special journal supplements that
feature articles about off-label uses.
Id. at 280; see also Rheingold & Rheingold, supra note 5, at 53 (arguing “[o]ff-label
use is a fiscal boon to manufacturers. . . . Fen-phen is perhaps the best example of
this. Sales of two drugs that had virtually no market when prescribed under their
FDA approval suddenly skyrocketed when doctors began to prescribe them
together and for a long period.”).
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With the increased practice of prescribing drugs for off-label use,
coupled with a somewhat dated and incomplete medical
negligence standard in Minnesota, the intersection of the off-label
use doctrine with Minnesota’s medical negligence standard is ripe
for review.
This article examines the off-label use doctrine and the
medical negligence standard under Minnesota law. First, the
10
article examines what the phrase “off-label use” means. Next, the
article explores the cases that have arisen in Minnesota which
address medical malpractice claims arising, at least in part, because
11
of off-label uses. Finally, the article concludes with the author’s
observations about whether off-label use should be a cause for
12
concern.
In part, the author considers whether increased offlabel use presents new legal issues for physicians, patients, and
13
attorneys.
II. WHAT IS OFF-LABEL USE?
14

In 1962, Congress amended the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
(the Act) to give the FDA the power to assess the safety and
effectiveness of all drugs before they could be sold in the United
15
States.
The Drug Amendments of 1962 constitute a
comprehensive
regulatory
scheme
that
addresses
the
16
manufacturing and marketing of drugs for human use. Under
the Act, before a drug can be marketed it must receive FDA
17
approval. The FDA will not grant approval unless a drug is shown
18
to be safe and effective. Moreover, prior to marketing, the FDA
19
reviews the package literature. The package literature, commonly
10. See infra Part II. This article addresses off-label use only in the context of
prescription drugs. The phrase is also used in connection with medical devices,
which is a use not addressed in this article.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See id.
14. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–99 (2000).
15. See recitation of legislative history in 21 U.S.C. § 301 (adding sections
358–60, and amending sections 321, 331, 332, 348, 351, 353, 355, 357, 372, 374,
376, and 381 (collectively referred to as the “Drug Amendments of 1962”)).
16. Id.
17. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000). For a description of the FDA approval process
for new drugs, see David A. Kessler, The Regulation of Investigational Drugs, 320 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 281, 281–83 (1989).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
19. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.56–.57, 201.100 (2004).
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referred to as the “package insert,” may only refer to the approved
20
uses for the drug.
The complex and detailed regulatory scheme used by the FDA
to assess whether, and under what circumstances, a drug can be
marketed creates the public perception that drugs with FDA
approval are tested and safe for all circumstances in which they are
used. Yet the FDA has always tried to steer clear of interfering with
the practice of medicine. Thus, the FDA openly acknowledges that
“the FD&C Act does not limit the manner in which a physician may
21
use an approved drug.” The FDA does not exercise any oversight
22
over the practice of medicine.
The presence of the complex and lengthy regulatory process
required to bring a new drug to market, oversight by the FDA, and
the FDA’s hands-off approach to the practice of medicine gives rise
to a fact that is little known to the public at large. Namely, once a
drug receives FDA approval, physicians may prescribe that drug for
23
any purpose, including, but not limited to, the FDA approved use.
Prescribing a drug for a use other than the FDA approved use
24
25
is commonly referred to as “off-label” or “unlabeled” use. Offlabel use of an FDA approved product is defined as a “specific use
26
for which that product has not been approved.” Off-label use can
take several forms, including prescribing an approved drug to treat
a disease or condition that is not indicated on the manufacturer’s
label, treating the indicated disease but varying the approved
dosage, or prescribing the drug to a patient population other than
27
the intended patient population.
Off-label use is extremely common, with one study suggesting
28
that most hospital patients receive at least one drug off-label, and
20. The package insert must contain certain information intended to ensure
safe and effective use of the drug, including information relating to the following
topics:
description;
clinical
pharmacology;
indications
and
usage;
contraindications; warnings; precautions; adverse reactions; drug abuse and
dependence; over-dosage; dosage and administration; how supplied; and date of
most recent revision to the labeling. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56.
21. 12 FOOD & DRUG BULL. 3, 5 (1982).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling the Regulatory
Vacuum, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 248 (1993).
25. 12 FOOD & DRUG BULL., supra note 21, at 5.
26. In re Kessler, 100 F.3d 1015, 1015 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
27. Christopher, supra note 24, at 248.
28. Scott Esposito, Off-Label Prescribing of Drugs Calls FDA Role Into Question,
PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Nov. 25, 2000 (citing Alex Tabarrok, Assessing the FDA via
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that the off-label use of some popular medications constitutes more
29
than half of all sales. For some drugs, off-label uses account for
30
ninety percent of all prescriptions sold for the drug. In addition
to being extremely common, the practice of off-label prescribing
31
appears to be increasing. At least one study found that off-label
32
prescriptions nearly doubled from 1998 to 2003. The rise in offlabel prescription drug use will most likely continue, particularly in
33
light of the change in Medicare law.
Is increased off-label use a cause for concern? Not necessarily.
Whether off-label use implies increased risk depends on the
circumstances. As the FDA explained, “the term ‘unapproved uses’
is, to some extent, misleading. It includes a variety of situations
34
ranging from unstudied to thoroughly investigated drug uses.”
For those situations where off-label use has been thoroughly
investigated, it is accepted practice, and may even constitute
35
malpractice if an off-label use is not offered to patients.
In
addition, off-label drug use plays a significant role in advances in
36
drug therapy and medical care. In other cases, even if an off-label
use is not dangerous, such use may not be ethically or politically
37
appropriate.
Because an FDA-approved drug can be prescribed for any
purpose, this article examines the constraints on physician off-label
prescribing practices under the Minnesota malpractice doctrine;
specifically, as it has evolved in cases concerning prescription
drugs.

the Anomaly of Off-Label Drug Prescribing, THE INDEP. REV., Summer 2000), at
http://www.independent.org/printer.asp?page=%2Fnewsroom%2Farticle%2Easp
?ID=179 (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
29. Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, Unapproved Drug Uses Study, Nov. 2003
(showing off-label prescriptions for the following drugs constituted more than half
of all prescriptions: Seroquel, Risperdal, Neurontin, Topamax, Biaxin XL,
Trazodone HCI, Bextra, and Avelox), at http://161.188.204.190/krdigital/drug.
30. Chris Adams & Alison Young, FDA Oversight of ‘Off-Label’ Drug Use Wanes,
KNIGHT RIDDER NEWSPAPERS, Nov. 4, 2003, at http://www.realcities.com/mld/
krwashington/news/special_packages/riskyrx/7152542.htm.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
34. 12 FOOD & DRUG BULL. 4, 5 (April 1982).
35. Stoffelmayr, supra note 3, at 278.
36. Henry, supra note 5, at 383 (noting that “[t]he regulatory process has not
been able to keep pace with innovation” and “[i]n many cases, off-label
prescribing is the standard of care.”).
37. Christopher, supra note 24, at 249.
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III. THE STATE OF THE LAW IN MINNESOTA
In a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must offer expert
testimony to establish the standard of care and the defendant’s
38
departure from it. If the case concerns allegations of improper
use of prescription drugs, is the fact that a physician deviated from
the package insert relevant to establishing the standard of care?
The answer under Minnesota law as it currently stands is
39
“possibly.”
The Minnesota Civil Jury Instruction Guides includes a
proposed jury instruction for claims of negligence by medical
professionals resulting from departures from drug manufacturers’
40
The proposed jury instruction sets forth the
instructions.
standard for negligence, stating:
A (doctor) (dentist) is negligent if:
1. The drug manufacturer gave clear and explicit
recommendations (and) (or) instructions for use of the
drug, and;
2.
The (doctor) (dentist) did not follow these
recommendations (and) (or) instructions.
The (doctor) (dentist) is negligent unless a reasonable
(doctor) (dentist) would not have followed these
recommendations (and) (or) instructions under the
41
circumstances.
Three cases form the basis for this proposed jury instruction and
42
each case is discussed below.
In 1970, in Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., the Minnesota
Supreme Court announced its rule with regard to the
circumstances under which off-label use constitutes medical
43
negligence.
The court initially described its rule as follows:
“Where the dosage is prescribed by the manufacturer, testimony of
the physician’s failure to adhere to its recommendation is sufficient
evidence to require him to explain the reason for his deviation.

38.
39.
40.

See Todd v. Eitel Hosp., 306 Minn. 254, 257, 237 N.W.2d 357, 359 (1975).
See infra Part IV.
See MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, MINN. PRACTICE SERIES, 4A JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES—CIVIL, CIVJIG 80.16, (4th ed. 1999).
41. Id.
42. The three cases are: Reinhardt v. Colton, 337 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1983);
Lhotka v. Larson, 307 Minn. 121, 238 N.W.2d 870 (1976); Mulder v. Parke Davis &
Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970).
43. 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882.
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This is particularly true where the manufacturer’s warning puts the
44
doctor on notice of potentially lethal effects.”
Two months later, in response to a petition for rehearing by
the Minnesota State Medical Association as amicus curiae, the court
expanded its rule:
Where a drug manufacturer recommends to the medical
profession (1) the conditions under which its drug should
be prescribed; (2) the disorders it is designed to relieve;
(3) the precautionary measures which should be
observed; and (4) warns of the dangers that are inherent
in its use, a doctor’s deviation from such
recommendations is prima facie evidence of negligence if
there is competent medical testimony that his patient’s
injury or death resulted from the doctor’s failure to
45
adhere to the recommendations.
The court also made clear that when such circumstances exist
“it is incumbent on the doctor to disclose his reasons for departing
46
from the procedures recommended by the manufacturer.” The
court acknowledged that it would “ordinarily be a jury question”
whether the physician justified or excused his deviation from the
47
manufacturer guidance.
The Minnesota Supreme Court next addressed the issue in
48
The court in Lhotka v. Larson considered whether a so1976.
called Mulder instruction was warranted where the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant physician “knowingly deviated from the
manufacturers’ instructions and recommendations on the use of
49
drugs which were administered in this case.” By the slimmest of
margins the court disagreed and, in the process, narrowed the
50
Mulder holding. The court concluded that a Mulder instruction
was not appropriate because the evidence did not establish a clear
51
deviation from the manufacturers’ instructions, and the drug
44. Id. at 339, 181 N.W.2d at 887 (citing Magee v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 29 Cal.
Rptr. 322, 328 (1963)).
45. Id at 339–40, 181 N.W.2d at 887.
46. Id. at 340, 181 N.W.2d at 887.
47. Id.
48. See Lhotka v. Larson, 307 Minn. 121, 238 N.W.2d 870 (1976).
49. Id. at 125, 238 N.W.2d at 873.
50. Chief Justice Sheran wrote the majority opinion, which three other
justices joined. Id. at 121, 238 N.W.2d at 870. Four justices, Chanak, joined by
Kelly, Todd, and Scott, dissented, and one justice, Otis took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 133, 238 N.W.2d at 878.
51. Id. at 127, 238 N.W.2d at 874 (stating “[w]e hold on these facts there was
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manufacturers’ recommendations were not sufficiently clear and
52
The court also
explicit to support the requested instruction.
noted that “[u]nderlying Mulder is the self-evident premise that
deviation from a manufacturer’s recommendations constitutes
prima facie evidence of negligence only when the conduct
complained of deviates from standards which are clear and
53
explicit.”
As the Lhotka dissent makes clear, however, the majority’s
54
holding rests on a thin reed. At issue in the case were the drugs
55
given to a woman in premature labor. It was undisputed that the
manufacturer’s insert for one of the drugs explicitly stated that
“‘fetal immaturity constitutes a relative contraindication’ for
56
administration . . . by injection.” The manufacturer’s insert with
regard to oral administration (which is how the drug was
administered to the plaintiff) contained no explicit
57
contraindication.
The dissent noted that the chemical
composition, whether administered orally or by injection, was the
58
same and, thus, the effect of the drug was essentially the same.
The dissent thus took the position that the jury should have
been given a Mulder instruction, contingent upon a prior jury
finding that the manufacturer’s recommendations were sufficiently
clear to put a reasonably prudent physician on notice that oral
59
administration was also contraindicated. The majority, however,
concluded that the manufacturer’s recommendations were not
clear as to oral administration and, therefore, a Mulder instruction
60
was not appropriate.
In 1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court further refined the
circumstances in which a so-called Mulder instruction might be

no basis in the manufacturers’ instructions for a finding that the Doctors Larson
failed to observe clear and explicit recommendations with respect to [the
medications at issue].”).
52. Id. at 125, 238 N.W.2d at 873–74.
53. Id. at 128 n.14, 238 N.W.2d at 875 n.14 (emphasis added).
54. See id. at 131–33, 238 N.W.2d at 877–78.
55. See id. at 123, 238 N.W.2d at 872 (noting that physician prescribed the
oral administration of three grains of Seconal, a brand of sodium secobarbital
used as a sedative to ease apprehension).
56. Id. at 131, 238 N.W.2d at 877 (quoting from the plaintiffs’ Exhibit K).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 132, 238 N.W.2d at 877. The only difference in terms of effects was
that “the drug would metabolize more slowly when administered orally.” Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 126, 238 N.W.2d at 874.
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61

warranted in the medical malpractice case Reinhardt v. Colton. In
Reinhardt, the court considered whether the trial court properly
directed a verdict for the defendants in connection with the
62
plaintiff’s claim of negligent treatment. In considering that issue,
the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed two issues concerning
Mulder.
First, the court observed that a Mulder instruction is
appropriate only “‘if there is competent medical testimony that
[the] patient’s injury or death resulted from the doctor’s failure to
63
adhere to the recommendations.’” Thus, in Reinhardt, although
the plaintiff introduced evidence that the physician did not
conduct a direct platelet count as recommended in the package
insert, but rather only estimated blood platelets, the plaintiff failed
to introduce evidence that the physician’s failure to take a direct
64
platelet count was the direct cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Second, the court in Reinhardt questioned, but did not resolve,
the issue of whether the type of off-label use was relevant to the
65
analysis of whether a Mulder instruction is appropriate.
The
Reinhardt court observed that in Mulder it
described the type of “package insert” which can serve as a
standard of care in this context as one which
recommends: “(1) the conditions under which its drug
should be prescribed; (2) the disorders it is designed to
relieve; (3) the precautionary measures which should be
observed; and [which] (4) warns of the dangers which are
66
inherent in its use.”
The court then noted that unlike the off-label use in Mulder,
61. 337 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1983).
62. Id. at 92–93.
63. Id. at 95 (quoting Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 340, 181
N.W.2d 882, 877 (1970)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 95 n.4. The court explained:
The Food and Drug Administration did not approve the use of [the drug
at issue] for rheumatoid arthritis until late 1978, and the package inserts
admitted as evidence at trial and applicable to the treatment period
(February 1977 to August 1977) do not list rheumatoid arthritis as an
approved indication. An issue therefore arises regarding whether the
package inserts introduced at trial can serve as a standard of care under
the criteria established in Mulder. However, . . . we need not address this
issue.
Id.
66. Id. (quoting Mulder, 288 Minn. at 339, 181 N.W.2d at 877).
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the off-label use at issue in Reinhardt was not a change in the
67
Instead, the physician defendant in
recommended dosage.
Reinhardt had prescribed a drug to treat an indication for which the
68
drug was not approved. As a result, the package inserts that were
used as evidence at trial made no mention of the plaintiff’s ailment
(the second factor identified in Mulder), thus raising the question
69
of whether the package inserts were relevant.
The court
acknowledged that its holding on the evidentiary issue concerning
causation eliminated the need to substantively address this second
70
issue and so did not affirmatively resolve it.
The Reinhardt
decision certainly leaves open the question of whether off-label use
71
to treat a different ailment even comes under the scope of Mulder.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the dramatic increase in off-label use, where are
physicians and patients left with respect to off-label use? Despite
the fact that Minnesota case law addressing issues of medical
negligence in the context of off-label use is somewhat well72
entrenched, should physicians be concerned about a possible
increase in exposure for off-label use? Should patients be worried?
The answer to both physician and patient fears is “probably not.”
Under Minnesota law as it currently stands, a physician is held
to the standard of care outlined in the manufacturer’s insert only
when the packaging insert is explicit, the physician clearly deviated
from the manufacturer’s recommendations or instructions, and the
73
physician’s deviation caused harm to the patient. It is an open
question whether Mulder is applicable only in dosage cases or
whether it would also apply in cases involving prescriptions for
indications not addressed in the manufacturer’s insert, which is a
common form of off-label use, or for use in patient populations
other than those recommended by the manufacturer. The
suggestion in Reinhardt is that a Mulder instruction could be

67. Compare Reinhardt, 337 N.W.2d at 95 n.4, with Mulder, 288 Minn. at 335,
181 N.W.2d at 885.
68. Reinhardt, 337 N.W.2d at 95 n.4.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. The three cases controlling medical negligence in Minnesota in the
context of off-label prescription drug use were decided in 1983, 1976, and 1970.
73. Reinhardt, 337 N.W.2d at 95.
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inappropriate in cases involving off-label use for a different
74
indication.
As a result, the pronouncement in Mulder, which has been
75
rejected by some courts, has been tempered by the subsequent
decisions into a rule that holds physicians to a reasonable
76
standard. The remaining legal questions are (1) whether Mulder
applies to situations where a physician prescribes a drug to a
patient outside of the manufacturer-defined patient populations,
and (2) whether Mulder applies to situations where a physician
prescribes a drug to treat a condition not referenced in the
package insert.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to decide a case that
directly answers these questions. Until the Minnesota Supreme
Court hears a case directly on point, it is unclear where the law
stands. By voicing concerns about the evidentiary value of the
package insert, the Reinhardt court hinted that it might resolve the
question about off-label use for treatment of an indication not
mentioned on the package insert by concluding that the insert
does not establish a standard of care in this type of case. The court
has provided no similar suggestion for off-label use in populations
other than the manufacturer-defined patient group. Attorneys are
likely to make arguments for and against extending Mulder in both
types of off-label use cases.
It is unclear whether Minnesota will encounter a significant
legal change as a result of increased off-label use. Nevertheless,
until the Minnesota Supreme Court addresses the law, or the state
legislature initiates a change, the areas of uncharted waters for
physicians are instances of off-label use for treatment of an
indication other than those listed on the package insert, and
74. Id. at 95 n.4.
75. See Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 135 (Utah 1989). The Ramon court
noted that there is a split among authorities. Id. at 134 (stating “[w]e recognize
that the courts appear to be split on whether the recommendations contained in a
package insert are prima facie evidence of the standard of care.”). The Ramon
court expressly declined to follow Mulder, observing that only “a few other states”
have followed Mulder, and the Minnesota courts “have since retreated somewhat
from the Mulder standard.” Id. (citing Lhotka v. Larson, 307 Minn. 121, 131–32,
238 N.W.2d 870, 877 (1976)). The Ramon court adopted a rule that a
manufacturer’s recommendations are “some evidence that the finder of fact may
consider along with expert testimony on the standard of care.” Id. at 135 (citing
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 180 (Cal. Ct. App.
1957)).
76. Reinhardt, 337 N.W.2d at 95.
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prescriptions given to patients outside the manufacturer-defined
patient populations. Today, Minnesota medical negligence law,
although well-established, remains incomplete.
Should patients be concerned about the rise in the use of offlabel prescriptions coupled with a Mulder holding that has been
softened over the years? No. Physicians’ actions are, and will likely
continue to be, judged against a reasonable standard of care that
serves to constrain physicians from straying beyond the bounds of
reasonableness. In addition, patients have and continue to use
tools at their disposal (both malpractice actions and complaints to
77
the Board of Medical Practice ) to constrain prescribing practices.
Patients also have the right to know the risks involved in
78
recommended courses of treatment and should exercise that right
by asking questions about the medications they are being given.

77. See Kollmorgen v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 416 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (upholding a disciplinary order of the State Board of Medical
Examiners resulting from an over-prescription of medication that deviated from
the manufacturer’s recommendation).
78. See MINN. STAT. § 144.651, subd. 9 (2004) (Patient’s Bill of Rights).
“Patients and residents shall be given by their physicians complete and current
information concerning their diagnosis, treatment, alternatives, risks, and
prognosis as required by the physician’s legal duty to disclose.” Id.
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